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ABSTRACT
Despite the current environmental crises of anthropogenic climate change and environmental
degradation aﬄicting the world, dualisms of culture/nature, human/non-human and animate/
inanimate sustain a perspective on ‘the environment’ in which the human and the cultural are
privileged over the natural world and other species. Policies on ‘sustainable development’ are
likewise predicated upon eﬀorts to assure future human prosperity. Our objective in this paper is
to establish an alternative, post-anthropocentric perspective on environmental sustainability.
Drawing on feminist materialist scholarship supplies an ontology to critique humanist approaches,
and establishes the foundation for a posthuman sociology of environment, in which (post)humans
are an integral but not privileged element. We consider the implications of this perspective for both
sustainability policy and ‘climate justice’. A posthuman ontology leads to the conclusion – perhaps
surprisingly, given the anthropogenic roots of current climate change – that some unusual human
capacities are now essential to assure environmental potential.
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Introduction
Climate change, dramatic rises in species extinctions, and
life-threatening levels of pollution mean that issues of
environmental sustainability and sustainable develop-
ment are centre stage in research and policy. In this
paper, we explore the implications of a posthuman and
materialist ontology of human/environment interaction
for social research on sustainability and sustainable devel-
opment policy. Speciﬁcally, we look beyond mainstream
social theory, beyond mainstream Western philosophy
even, to establish a materialist and ‘posthuman’ perspec-
tive on environment that cuts across nature/culture and
human/non-human dualisms (van der Tuin and Dolphijn
2010, 156–158). This, we shall suggest, oﬀers a radical but
productive understanding of both ‘environment’ and
environmental ‘sustainability’1 that aﬀects sociological
understanding of how to engage with the pressing envir-
onmental issues of climate change and sustainable devel-
opment while also addressing environmental or climate
justice (Schlosberg and Collins 2014).
Culture/nature dualism has supplied post-
Enlightenment philosophers, scientists and social scien-
tists with a neat way to set limits on the respective
concerns of the social and natural sciences (Fox and
Alldred, 2016; Barad 1996, 181; Braidotti 2013, 3; Meloni
2016). However, when exploring issues of embodiment,
anthropogenic climate change, or the eﬀects of the built
environment on well-being, such a distinction becomes
problematic (Lidskog and Waterton 2016, 399). Recent
scholarship in both natural and social sciences suggests
that the natural and cultural are intertwined (Landeker
and Panofsky, 2013; Lockie 2012, 2; Meloni 2014; Walker
2005, 81), and that culture/nature dualism imposes a false
division to understanding these complex processes
(Barad 1996, 180; Latour 1993; Rice 2013, 257).
Furthermore, nature/culture dualism in philosophy and
social theory sidelinesmany non-Western ontologies that
recognise humans as integral to ‘environment’ (Rosiek,
Snyder, and Pratt 2019; Todd 2016) reinforcing
Eurocentric and colonialist knowledge and perspectives
concerning ‘nature’ (Braun 1997; Sundberg 2014, 33).
With these critiques in mind, we shall argue that
sociological analysis of environment and environmental
sustainability needs to overcome anthropocentric privi-
leging of the human over the non-human (Haraway
1991, 11) – to develop a perspective on the environment
that – rather than diﬀerentiating the realms of human
and non-human – draws culture and nature into one
aﬀective assemblage.2 Drawing upon feminist and
materialist scholarship, we set out a ‘posthuman’ per-
spective that integrates what we shall term ‘posthu-
mans’ fully within the environment, and consequently
de-stabilises conventional notions of environmental sus-
tainability. We oﬀer a perspective on ‘sustainable devel-
opment’ as ecological potential, independent – but at
the same time inclusive – of (post)human capacities.
Sustainability, sociology, posthumanism
If, as feminist biologist and social theorist Donna
Haraway has suggested, nature has long been culture’s
‘Other’ (1992, 65), contemporarymoveswithin sociology
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have sought to move beyond this dualism – toward
a post-anthropocentric perspective on ‘environment’.3
Such a post-anthropocentricmove is not a new perspec-
tive. Recent post-colonial theory has suggested that
more-than-human perspectives in recent Western social
theory recapitulate much earlier non-Western and indi-
genous ontologies. In these latter perspectives
amultiplicity of beings cast as human and nonhuman –
people, plants, animals, energies, technological
objects – participate in the coproduction of socio-
political collectives (Sundberg 2014, 33).
Such approaches oﬀer the possibility for ethical recipro-
city with non-human agents and a ‘sense of responsibility
to something more than human’ (Rosiek, Snyder, and
Pratt 2019, 12). Here we complement these indigenous
ontologies with feminist materialist and posthuman
scholarship, which argues for the aﬀectivity or vitality of
all matter (Bennett 2010; Braidotti 2013). We will suggest
that these supply the basis for a posthumanist engage-
ment that is transversal to culture/nature dualism, and
unsettles conceptions of ‘environment’, of ‘sustainability’,
of ‘sustainable development’, and indeed of ‘human’
itself. This sets the scene for a post-anthropocentric policy
orientation that engages with the pressing environmen-
tal concerns of the present age: climate change and
environmental degradation by human activities.
Issues of environment have been addressed variously
by feminist materialist scholars. For Haraway (1992, 150),
nature/culture dualism is grounded in colonialism and
racism, patriarchy and sexism, and reﬂects a capitalist
appropriation of nature for the exclusive beneﬁt of
human culture. Her feminist and materialist project
explored the proliferation of technologies and associated
scientiﬁc perspectives that increasingly impinge upon
human bodies, with the cultural trope of the ‘cyborg’ as
her locating hook (Haraway 1991). Just as cyborgs chal-
lenge nature/culture dualism, entities labelled as ‘apes’
and ‘women’ – she argues – also unsettle the ‘evolution-
ary, technological and biological narratives’ that fostered
distinctions between ‘the natural’ and ‘the human’
(ibid: 2). Such entities transgress the leaky boundary
between these domains, providing the means to reveal
the continuities between humans and the rest of the
material universe (ibid: 154). These transgressions, sug-
gests, have the potential to tear down ‘a Berlin Wall
between the world of objects and the world of subjects’,
revealing that nature and culture are inextricably coter-
minous in all bodies (Haraway 1997, 270).
Haraway’s work is a key inﬂuence upon Braidotti’s
(2006b, 2011, 2013, 2019) extended development of
a materialist, feminist and posthuman philosophy and
ethics of environment, which argues that human inter-
ests cannot be divorced from the interests of other living
things and of the physical Earth. Braidotti (2013, 26)
describes her posthuman approach as dialectically emer-
gent from the humanisms and anti-humanisms to be
found in social theory and the humanities. Humanism
provided the anthropocentric challenge to religious
authority that supplied the foundations for social and
political changes including the French Revolution, ﬁrst-
wave feminism and the anti-slaverymovement. However,
Braidotti (2006a, 200, 2011, 82, 88–89) suggests that the
‘human’ who was the measure of all things turned out to
be white, male, able-bodied and exploitative of all other
life-forms. Anti-humanist theories rejected the anthropo-
centrism of humanism, and – most recently via post-
structuralist theory – proclaimed the death of ‘Man’ as
an intrinsically progressive force (Braidotti 2013, 23). The
latter thereby supplied a crucible for ‘alternative models
of the human subject’ that challenge the white, male,
Western subject of humanism (ibid: 38).4
Despite these critical advances, Braidotti argues that
anti-humanism risks throwing out the progressive
achievements of humanism concerning solidarity, social
justice and equality (2013, 29), and that it would be an
ironic act of humanist hubris for humans to assert the end
of humanism (2013, 30).While acknowledging the validity
of the anti-humanist critique of humanism as a totalising
conceptualisation, Braidotti (2013, 38, 45) oﬀers instead
a critical and aﬃrmative ‘posthuman’ eco-philosophy that
establishes a continuumbetween posthuman bodies and
non-human matter (2013, 104) and between subjectivity
andecology (2006b, 41). This, in turn, constitutes an ethics
based on a new sense of inter-connectedness between all
matter: ‘an aﬃrmative bond that locates the subject in the
ﬂow of relations with multiple others’ (2013, 50, see also
Conty 2018, 91; Cudworth and Hobden 2015; Franklin
2006; Pickering 2005, 33–35).
Braidotti’s materialist posthumanism embraces two
shifts: from essentialism to relationality, and from
(human) agency to material aﬀectivity. On the move
from essences to relationality, this ‘new’ materialism
(Braidotti 2019, 45; Coole and Frost 2010; Cudworth
and Hobden 2015) rejects notions of pre-existent, ﬁxed
entities such as bodies, animals, plants, bacteria, dis-
eases, fossil fuels, atmospheric conditions, climates,
coastlines, economic and political systems, consumers,
motor vehicles or governments. Rather, these myriad
materialities are relational, gaining form and continuity
through their engagements with the other material rela-
tions with which they assemble, and through the emer-
gent capacities or ‘becomings’ that they gain in these
interactions (Deleuze 1988, 125; DeLanda 2006, 3).
Events and interactions are considered as assemblages
(Bennett 2005, 445; Pickering 2005, 34): arrangements or
orderings (Buchanan 2017, 465) of relations (bodies,
things, social institutions and constructs) that are inher-
ently ﬂuid and continually in ﬂux (Deleuze 1988, 128;
Lemke 2015).5
In place of human agency as the primemover of social
production, new materialists such as Braidotti and Jane
Bennett proclaim the liveliness and aﬀectivity of all mat-
ter; a ‘thing-power’ (Bennett 2010, 2) associated with all
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materiality. In Bennett’s view, human agency is itself
a subset of thing-power, though a consequence of
a human body’s component materialities (bone, muscle,
blood and so forth) rather than itsmotivation by an active
soul or mind (ibid: 10). This perspective cuts across dis-
tinctions between human bodies and all the other stuﬀ
conventionally treated as the ‘environment’: all the dis-
parate materialities that may assemble together within
an event have capacities to aﬀect – or to be aﬀected by –
other assembled relations (Braidotti 2019, 45–46; Deleuze
1988, 101).
These two aspects of materialist ontology supply our
starting-point for new ways of thinking about nature and
culture, for how we research the social and natural
worlds, and as we shall show later, a new perspective
upon sustainability and sustainable development.
Feminist materialism aﬃrms the commonalities and con-
nectedness of all matter (Braidotti 2013, 50). This includes
human bodies and other ‘human’ stuﬀ such as thoughts,
ideas,memories, aspirations that have capacities tomate-
rially aﬀect are drawn into a single assemblage; ‘social’
stuﬀ such as organisations and social formations; and all
the ‘natural’ stuﬀ that constitutes the physical world (van
der Tuin and Dolphijn 2010). In this ontology, ‘environ-
ment’ is no longer simply the context for human agency,
but the arena for the production of the entirety of both
‘natural’ and ‘social’ worlds. There is nothing beyond
environment, and nothing (for instance, humans and
their diverse cultures) excluded from it.
From ‘sustainable development’ to enabling
ecological potential
Sustainability has been a contested concept in policy
and scholarly circles (Braidotti 1994; Fleurbaey et al.
2014, 293; Lockie 2016; Ratner 2004), with a range of
natural science, ecological, economic, political, social
justice and other perspectives jostling over the inter-
actions and conﬂicts between nature and culture. The
associated concept of ‘sustainable development’
draws upon environmentalism, economics, political
science and international relations (Pearce,
Markandya, and Barbier 1989; Whitehead 2014,
260–261), and has been elevated to the status of
a policy goal in ﬁelds including energy production
and consumption, employment and housing
(Dempsey et al. 2011; Griggs et al. 2013).
Many environmental policy statements on sustainable
development have been founded upon humanist and
anthropocentric sentiments. The 1987 Report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development
(the ‘Brundtland Report’) deﬁned sustainable develop-
ment as ‘development that meets the needs of the pre-
sent without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland et al.
1987, 37). The subsequent UN Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment considered the eﬀects of ecosystem change
upon human well-being, and how to the conserve and
sustain ecosystems so they may ‘continue to supply the
services that underpin all aspects of human life’ (World
Health Organisation (WHO) 2005, ii).
This emphasis is recapitulated in more recent UN
policy statements such as the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, which argues that economic
growth, social justice and environmental protection
are ‘integrated and indivisible’ goals (United Nations
(UN) 2015, 1), while explicitly setting the eradication of
poverty as the ‘greatest global challenge’ (ibid.).
Environmental sustainability depends upon ending
global poverty, improving access to education and
basic services, ending social discrimination and exclu-
sion, and enabling participation in decision-making
(United Nations (UN) 2016: Goal 1). So, for example,
eradicating poverty among indigent farmers will also
eradicate the illegal logging that is contributing to
climate change (Whitehead 2014, 259); education and
clean water will enhance women’s and girls’ participa-
tion in the economy and polity, with knock-on eﬀects
for conserving natural resources.6 Of the 17 goals set
out in the Agenda (see Figure 1), 13 focused upon the
quality of human life, while only three (on climate
action, and conserving marine and terrestrial wildlife)
address the non-human environment (United Nations
(UN) 2016).
seitilauqenidecudeR.01ytrevopoN.1
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3.  Good health and well-being 12. Responsible consumption and production 
noitcaetamilC.31noitacudeytilauQ.4
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6. Clean water and sanitation 15. Life on land 
7. Cheap and affordable energy 16.  Peace, justice and strong institutions 
8.  Decent work and economic growth 17.  Partnerships for the goals 
9. Industry, innovation and infrastructure  
Figure 1. United Nations 17 goals for sustainable development (UN, 2016).
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Despite this recent rhetoric on the ‘indivisibility’ of
Goals for human development and protection of the
‘non-human environment’ (United Nations (UN)
2015, 6), this formulation sustains the anthropocentrism
of the Brundtland Report, setting ‘humans’ apart from
(perhaps even ‘above’) the ‘environment’. This position
remains inﬂuential. Whitehead (2014, 263) has suggested,
following Bernstein (2000), that Brundtland established
the foundation for ‘liberal environmentalism’, a position
on environmental protection that downplays the contri-
bution of economic growth and free markets to current
environmental crises (Rees 2003). This perspective is
given a further neoliberal twist in ‘green capitalism’, in
which proﬁt and entrepreneurialism are considered the
means to save Earth from climate change by the devel-
opment of technologies to reduce carbon emissions or
geo-engineering to capture greenhouse gases already
polluting the atmosphere (Prudham 2009, 1596).
To develop an alternative, post-anthropocentric per-
spective on sustainability and sustainable development,
we would highlight three associated aspects from our
earlier discussion of feminist materialist and posthuma-
nist ontology. First, a posthuman approach requires that
we shift from an essentialist model of entities with ﬁxed
attributes (‘marble is hard but brittle; a human can think
and talk’) to a relational understanding. In such an ontol-
ogy, matter (animate and inanimate) is to be studied not
in terms of what it is or is not, but in terms of what it does
relationally: what associations it makes as it aﬀects and is
aﬀected, and what consequences and capacities derive
from these aﬀective interactions (DeLanda 2005; Deleuze
1988, 124–125). Rather than focusing upon humans as
‘individuals’ (literally: ‘indivisible’), what we may term
a ‘posthuman’ is an assemblage of biological, sociocul-
tural and environmental elements, whose capacities to
aﬀect and be aﬀected are contingent upon setting and
emergent in its relations with other matter (Barad 2001,
96; DeLanda 2006, 10–11).
Second, the recognition that capacities are always
context-dependent requires that we also acknowledge
the unevenness of how ‘human’ capacities manifest. As
Haraway (1991, 158) has revealed, sexism, colonialismand
anthropocentrism have sustained the privilege of some
(predominantly male, white, rich and Western) humans
over others and over non-human animate and inanimate
matter. In this analysis, a supremacist politics of sexualisa-
tion, racialisation and naturalisation of the West’s Others
(ibid: 150) has led to the despoliation of the environment,
the current environmental crisis of climate change and
the inequalities between global North and South. The
category of ‘human’ and the concept of ‘humanity’ are
revealed as humanist aggregations that obscure the
diversity and inequalities between genders, races,
incomes, abilities, nationalities and other stratiﬁcations
(Braidotti 2019, 159). Within this diversity, some play
a much greater part in using energy and resources and
generating pollution than others (Agyeman and
Evans 2004; Klinsky et al. 2017). This insight aﬃrms that
a posthuman ontology and ethics incorporates a concern
with social justice to challenge these inequities, while
policies to address climate change must also address
‘climate justice’ (Schlosberg and Collins 2014). Our termi-
nological use of ‘(post)humans’ in the remainder of this
paper is an eﬀort to mark out this critical recognition of
diversity and inequalities, in place of the aggregating
terms ‘humans’ and ‘humanity’.
Third, that methodologically, analysis of issues of
sustainability or sustainable development must resist
assessing events in terms of humanistic values or by
ascribing privilege to human agency (Bennett 2010,
120; Braidotti 2013, 56). Events assemble because of
the aﬀective capacities of both (post)human and non-
human matter, but in turn, it is these assemblages that
produce (post)human and non-human capacities
(Cudworth and Hobden 2015, 140). Consequently, non-
human materialities are ‘bona ﬁde participants’ within
events and interactions, rather than ‘recalcitrant objects,
social constructs, or instrumentalities’ (Bennett, 2010,
62, see also Fox and Alldred, 2018; Conty 2018).
Understanding the impact of an environmental event
requires assessing all the capacities it produces – for
both (post)human and non-human matter: which pos-
sibilities are opened up and which are constrained or
closed down by this assemblage (Braidotti 2013, 60; see
also Buchanan 1997 on an ethics of becoming).
With these three aspects of posthuman ontology in
mind, ‘sustainability’ is no longer to be considered as
a state to be achieved, but rather as a ﬂow of multiple
aﬀects that produces capacities and potential in (post)
human and non-human matter (Braidotti 2011, 312–3;
Parr 2009, 161). This post-anthropocentric understanding
of sustainability and sustainable development moves
beyond a narrow focus on ‘human’ potential, to acknowl-
edge the capacity of all matter non-human as well as
(post)human to ‘become other’ (Guattari 2000, 20): in
other words, to enhance its capacities. Sustainable devel-
opment in this perspective means acknowledging the
potentials and ‘becomings’ of all elements of the assem-
blage. These range from the interactions between earth,
air and water in the nitrogen and water cycles of the
physical environment, to the productive life-courses of
the diverse multiplicity of plants and wild animals, to the
opportunities for all humans to work, play and interact
productively – and to acknowledge these capacities in
ways that do not oppose (post)human capacities to those
of other materialities.
At the same time, with (post)humans no longer onto-
logically separate from the environment, an ethics of
becoming (Braidotti 2013, 100) applies asmuch to (post)
humans’ capacities as to the becoming of the non-
human. ‘Sustainable development’ is replaced with
‘(post)human becoming’, focusing not upon sustained
human privilege over other parts of the environment,
but upon addressing inequities between (post)humans
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based on income, geography, race and gender. What
counterposes such a recognition to an anthropocentric
focus is that now possibilities for becoming are located
within a broader concern with ecological potential and
diversity: what sustains ‘the environment’ can also be
‘emancipatory’ of (post)humans (Cudworth and Hobden
2015, 144).
This posthuman perspective on sustainability as eco-
logical potential subtly shifts howwe should consider the
17 goals of the United Nations statement on sustainable
development discussed earlier. As was noted, these have
been articulated within a discourse that ties environmen-
tal sustainability ‘indivisibly’ to economic and human
social development; indeed, that considers the latter as
a necessary precondition for the achievement of the
former. While not rejecting the valid aspirations of the
UN and other bodies to emancipate (post)humans eco-
nomically and socially, once the latter are regarded as
integral to the environment, this distinction dissolves.
The posthuman commitment must be instead to pro-
mote those actions that can enhance the environment’s –
and consequently also (post)human – potentialities, and
moderate those that would limit that potential – be that
by exhausting natural resources, ﬁlling the atmosphere
with greenhouse gases, or limiting human possibilities
through poverty, economic inequities or threats to
health. We further develop this proposition, and its sig-
niﬁcance for environmental sustainability policy, in the
following section.
Posthumanism, policy and the unusual
capacities of (post)humans
If, as we have argued, global policy on sustainability and
sustainable development is framed by anthropocentr-
ism, the same can also be said for much other environ-
mental decision-making, right down to the planning
committees of local government that adjudicate on
proposals for the natural and built environment. These
assessments weigh concerns for the natural environ-
ment against national or local economic interests (Fox
and Alldred, 2017, 39). However, it would be simplistic
to consider this a balancing act between humanist and
anti-humanist values. Often, protection of the environ-
ment conceals desires to ensure and protect (post)
human opportunities to enjoy natural beauty or interact
with wildlife, protect pollinators essential for agriculture,
prevent threats to livelihoods or housing and so forth.
Take, for example, recent campaigns and legal struggles
for and against shale gas extraction. US and UK policy-
makers embraced extraction as a means to both lower
prices and provide energy security. But while local cam-
paigners’ opposition has been partly about environ-
mental despoliation. it was mostly to do with human
safety and protection of property and water supplies
from earthquakes caused by the drilling technology
(Cotton, Rattle, and James 2014). All too often, such
policymaking is about weighing one anthropocentric
interest against another.
The posthuman perspective we have developed in
this paper steps outside this humanist framing of policy.
With (post)humans understood as an integral compo-
nent of environment, (post)human and non-human mat-
ter are inextricably entangled in a simultaneously
geological, geographical, cultural, social and aﬀective
assemblage. Minerals, wind, air, trees, wildlife, (post)
humans, technologies, money, social formations and
a myriad of other material constituents interact in
a complex and unending aﬀective ﬂow. Environmental
policymaking is no longer a balancing act between ‘envir-
onmental’ and ‘human’ concerns. Rather than privileging
the latter over the former (humanism) or the former over
the latter (anti-humanism), or indeed, privileging the
capacities of some (rich, male, global North) over others,
posthuman environmental policy aims to enhance the
capacities of both non-human and (post)human.
Does that mean that in practice, posthuman policy
should operate to the maxim: ‘tread lightly on the earth’,
as environmentalists have sometimes argued (Bennett
2010, 121)? To further unpack what a posthuman policy
on sustainability as ecological potential entails, we turn
once again to feminist materialist scholarship, and parti-
cularly the work of Jane Bennett. The aﬀectivity and
emergent capacities of matter, Bennett (2010, 117) has
argued, imbues the material world with a vitality that has
been largely ignored in humanist and anthropocentric
perspectives. (Post)humans are no longer prime movers;
no longer in charge of the ‘irrepressible ﬂows of encoun-
ters, interactions, aﬀectivity and desire’ (Braidotti 2013,
100) that produce the world and everything in it. These
ﬂows (which are the ‘becoming’ of the planet) are the
engine by which the global environment gets on – con-
tinually – with its assembling, dis-assembling, transform-
ing and becoming. (Post)humans may be an integral part
of that becoming, but they are not its lone architects
(Bennett 2005).
Bennett’s analysis oﬀers a means to operationalise
a posthuman ‘sustainable becoming’ policy. All matter
has potential to ‘become’, be this a geological, meteor-
ological, biological, economic, sociocultural, emotional
or psychological becoming. An ethics of sustainability
as ecological potential may be founded on the extent
to which any action enables and enhances capacities
(for instance, the capacity of the atmosphere to regu-
late the earth’s climate or the capacity of living organ-
isms to engage productively with their ecological
niches). By contrast, acts that constrain becoming are
environmentally unethical. Such constraints include
actions that treat (post)human and non-matter as
exploitable resources to which exchange value is
ascribed (Moore 2017, 606); non-renewable use of ani-
mals, plants or materials; and policies and economic
systems that sustain social and economic inequalities
and injustices (Baer, 2018, 42).7
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However, while this ethics may go some way to
redress the ecological balance between (post)human
and non-human, Bennett (2010, 121–122) goes on to
make a further key point about the capacities of (post)
humans as part of ‘the environment’. In an environ-
ment in which (post)humans are merely one aﬀectivity
among many,
. . . frugality is too simple a maxim. Sometimes, eco-
health will require individuals and collectivities to back
oﬀ or ramp down their activeness, and sometimes it
will call for grander, more dramatic and violent expen-
ditures of human energy (Bennett 2010, 122).
It appears clear to us that we live now in circumstances
where the latter option applies. If therewere once a time
when humans could have stepped back to let the Earth
and all the vital materialities it comprises ‘get on with it’,
in the era of anthropogenic climate change andmassive
environmental degradation, this can no longer be the
whole basis for posthuman sustainability policy.
Building on this assessment, our next proposition is
radical, perhaps even seeming counter-intuitive within
the post-anthropocentric framing of environment we
have developed. We would suggest that (post)humans
sometimes manifest relationally some unusual capaci-
ties that must not be ignored or sidelined. These
include the capacity to attribute meaning to – or
otherwise conceptualise – events; to act altruistically
towards unknown others; to imagine the future and
create technologies to deliver it; and to use reason to
theorise, predict or anticipate future or unseen events
(see also Murdoch 2001, 127; Schmidt 2013, 189–190).
We would further contend that these unusual capa-
cities are now – perhaps ironically – essential to address
anthropogenic environmental challenges. They should
not be denied or rejected simply to assert an ecological
purism that sees ‘humanity’ as the problem but need to
be part of a vital materialist mix, along with the material
capacities of non-human elements of the environment
(Lorimer 2015, 4). The present climate change crisis will
not only aﬀect (post)human existence but that of many
millions of living organisms, many of which face extinc-
tion – with unknown consequences for a biosphere that
has evolved over billions of years (Thomas et al. 2004;
Urban 2015). Anthropogenic de-stabilisations of ecolo-
gies can lead to catastrophic changes such as desertiﬁ-
cation or out-of-control greenhouse gas emissions
(Scheﬀer et al. 2001), which in a worst-case scenario
could render Earth uninhabitable by known life-forms.
Evolutionary and geological time-scales are too slow to
address either the eﬀects or the causes of spiralling
anthropogenic climate change, including the kinds of
socio-political conﬂicts between economic and environ-
mental interests over continued fossil fuel extraction
described earlier.
In these circumstances, the physical capacities of
non-human matter must be augmented with these
unusual (post)human capacities. For example, the lat-
ter can be applied to predict, model and enact possible
environmental, political and economic futures; to
develop technologies such as carbon capture that
can reduce the concentrations of atmospheric green-
house gases; and to act altruistically to protect the
non-human elements of the environment.8
However, this is not to re-privilege (post)human rea-
son and ingenuity by the back door (for instance, by
assuming that the market and technology can together
solve climate change, as argued by ‘green capitalists’
(Prudham 2009, 1596; Zysman and Huberty 2014), nor is
it a return to an earlier humanist ‘exemptionalist’ thesis
(Dunlap and Catton 1994) that once again separates
(post)humans from the rest of the environment.
A posthuman environmental ethos is no longer con-
cerned merely to assure that the Earth’s resources
remain in place for a few more (post)human genera-
tions, or to replace (post)human with non-human privi-
lege. Instead, its objective is to encourage processes of
becoming that together produce an environment that is
endlessly emerging, changing, fragmenting and fractur-
ing, opening up both (post)human and non-human
possibilities rather than closing them down. By devel-
oping and activating the full range of (post)human and
non-human capacities at our disposal, we can establish
an environment-assemblage that is vital, self-organising
and emergent. Thatmust be the driver of environmental
policy as we confront the current crises (see Fox and
Alldred, 2020, for more on a posthuman policy response
to climate change).
Discussion
We have set out here a case for a post-anthropocentric
ontology of environment, founded upon feminist mate-
rialist scholarship, that draws human and non-human
relations into a single realm rather than setting them in
opposition. This posthuman ontology cuts across
humanism and anti-humanism, acknowledging the
positive aspects of both, while highlighting critically
disadvantages of each as the exclusive basis for
a science and an ethics of environment. It incorporates
humanism’s celebration of individual and collective
(post)human potential. From anti-humanism it recog-
nises the limitations of humanism – both in terms of
its privileging of humans over other animate and inan-
imate matter, and the aggregating and diﬀerence-
denying conception of ‘humanity’ created in the image
of a white, male, rich human from the global North.
This synthesis has the capacity to cut across dualisms
of human/non-human and culture/nature, to open up
new perspectives on sustainability, sustainable develop-
ment policy and action to address the burgeoning crisis
of climate change. Its foundations in materialist theory
established two divergences from previous work. First, it
theorises (post)humanity as an integral material
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constituent of ‘the environment’, neither privileged nor
de-privileged in relation to non-human matter. Second,
it emphasises the relational character of materiality.
Rather than entities with deﬁned attributes, matter
gains its capacities to aﬀect and be aﬀected when
assembled with other materialities. Consequently,
what a body or another other matter can do is entirely
contingent and contextual: an important feature for
a theory of environment.
An emphasis on the contextuality of capacities in
posthuman ontology oﬀers a further opportunity for
environmental sociology: it makes a concern for social
justice and ‘climate justice’ (Schlosberg and Collins 2014)
an inextricable element within discussions of environ-
mental policy and activism. ‘Humans’ have convention-
ally been deﬁned in terms of speciﬁc attributes held in
common, and divergences between these attributes and
those of other animate and inanimate matter. However,
from a posthuman perspective, capacities are not univer-
sal attributes of ‘human’ bodies/minds, but are emergent,
relational and contingent upon contexts including geo-
graphy, income, race, gender and other social stratiﬁca-
tions. Environmental impacts on (post)humans (such as
diseases, pollution, ﬂooding and so on) intersect with
these stratiﬁcations, such that environmental changes
due to climate or pollution do not aﬀect all (post)humans
equally. Posthuman policies must acknowledge the
uneven impact of climate change on global North and
South, and incorporate a commitment to social justice as
a core element, thereby supplying a critical edge to
a posthuman ontology of environment (Cudworth and
Hobden 2015, 144–145).
In the second part of the paper, we explored how this
posthuman ontology can inform a post-anthropocentric
perspective on sustainability and sustainable develop-
ment. We critiqued the UN policy statements on sustain-
able development for their implicit anthropocentrism,
which treats the Earth as a resource to be enjoyed by
future generations of humans. In particular, we criticised
the twin track approach to sustainability that links envir-
onmental protection ﬁrmly to the social and economic
development of humans, while downplaying (poten-
tially disastrously) development and economic growth
as core drivers of environmental degradation and global
climate change (Baer, 2018; Rees 2003). This link
between environmental protection and economic
development sustains an anthropocentric bias in policy,
and opens the way to ‘green capitalist’ policies based on
amarket economy, while closing the door on no-growth
approaches that recognise the environmental harm that
capitalism’s endless search for growth and proﬁt brings.
The post-anthropocentric alternative that we have
proposed regards sustainability not from the narrow per-
spective of human well-being but as a far broader con-
cern with ecological potential. This shift requires that
matter (non-human and human) should be valorised for
its relational liveliness and potential for becoming, rather
than for how its capacities contribute to human health,
economic prosperity, pleasure or even survival.
Furthermore, a relational focus means acknowledging
the unusual or even unknown capacities of diﬀerent
(post)human and non-human matters – because of the
complexity of possible relations between materialities,
we simply have no idea of the extent of what matter
can do (Bennett 2010, xv). Consequently, a post-
anthropocentric environmental ethics of ‘fostering ecolo-
gical potential’ goes beyond valuing merely those capa-
cities of a bird or a rock or theweather that impinge upon
(post)human bodies. It will entail removing barriers or
constraints on the emergent capacities of both non-
human and (post)human matter to forge productive
interactions and engagements: physically, chemically,
biochemically, physiologically, psychologically or socially.
Such an agenda has profound implications for
environmental policy, and we will conclude with
a few brief reﬂections on sustainability policy.
Elsewhere (Fox and Alldred, 2016,) we have argued
that a posthuman policy to address climate change
must address the multiple and complex ﬂows that
link (post)human and non-human matter. Evidence
from both natural and social science research can
reveal the constellations of relations and aﬀects that
produce global and local environmental events,
including climate change and environmental degrada-
tions. Fortunately, much of this research has already
been done and has been collated in the UN work on
sustainable development (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) 2013, Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) 2014). While we have been
strongly critical of the UN position that links (post)
human economic development to environmental pro-
tection for its anthropocentrism and underlying
humanism, its recent emphasis on the ‘indivisibility’
of human and non-human suggests some potential
convergence with the posthuman ontology outlined
here. Further, the UN’s concern with alleviating both
poverty and climate change chimes with the social
justice agenda that we have developed as part of
a posthuman approach.
What is disturbing, however, is the poor progress
towards those of the UN’s 2030 Goals (United Nations
(UN) 2015) that seek to address environment degrada-
tion and climate change – as acknowledged in its 2019
review (United Nations (UN) 2019, 1). This failure, we
would argue, derives directly from the anthropocentr-
ism of a position that ties environmental protection so
closely to human economic development and growth.
These latter endeavours contribute in so many ways to
constraining rather than enabling non-human capaci-
ties, for example by increased consumption of energy
and natural resources, waste production and consumer
demand (Baer 2008).
Our analysis consequently suggests the need for
an urgent shift in the UN perspective on
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sustainable development, replacing an anthropo-
centric with a post-anthropocentric and posthu-
man ontology of environment, and oﬀering
a more critical assessment of economic develop-
ment. However, this posthuman ethics also
requires that we engage fully with those unusual
(post)human capacities we outlined earlier: capaci-
ties that underpin both environmental policy-
making and activism. In the present climate
change crisis, (post)human responsibilities go far
beyond liberal environmentalist actions such as
reducing one’s carbon footprint, eating less meat
or avoiding single-use plastics. A shift toward no-
growth economics must be combined with local
actions (where the aﬀects and interactions of
daily life can foster ecological potential), national
initiatives to innovate carbon-neutral and carbon-
capture technologies, and trans-national pro-
grammes to re-distribute wealth from rich to
poor, from global North to global South (Authors,
forthcoming). Indeed, the ‘expenditures of human
energy’ that Bennett (2010, 122) calls for are
needed urgently and must be very grand and
very dramatic indeed.
Notes
1 As considered at length later in the paper, sustainability
is a contested concept that while addressing the conti-
nuity and diversity of the natural environment often is
located within an implicit concern with human well-
being and progress. Themost often referenced deﬁnition
(the Brundtland Report) sees sustainability as jointly
dependent upon economic, social and ecological
aspects, and described sustainable development as
‘development that meets the needs of the present with-
out compromising the ability of future [human] genera-
tions to meet their own needs’ (Brundtland, Khalid,
Agnelli et al. 1987, see also Lockie 2012).
2 In this paper, we apply a Deleuzian understanding of
‘aﬀect’ as ‘a capacity to aﬀect or be aﬀected’ (Deleuze
1988, 101). Aﬀect consequently replaces the concep-
tion of ‘agency’, often treated in social science as an
exclusive capacity of humans. Assemblages emerge
due to the aﬀects between their constituents.
3 Stevens (2012, 579) has argued for an ‘ecosociology’
that extends ideas of ‘the social’ beyond the human.
Latour (2005) went further, arguing for a sociology
that recognises social, biological and physical forces
as together producing the world around us (see also
Rice 2013, 257), while Lidskog and Waterton (2016,
399) suggest that in the ‘Anthropocene’ both physical
processes and human culture produce the ‘conditions
of possibility for life on earth’.
4 Anti-humanism refers to perspectives that displace con-
cern with humans, human subject and human experi-
ence from centre stage (Durkin 2014, 129), emphasising
instead the primacy of other entities such as non-human
organisms, technology, the natural environment or social
forces. Within sociology, it manifests in a range of
approaches, including Marxist and other structuralist
focuses on social structures and power, systems theories
and post-structuralism (Turner 1977; Paden 1987).
5 Newmaterialism describes awide range of philosophical,
feminist and social theory perspectives that recognise the
agentic capacities of all matter, and is not limited to the
Deleuzian ontology that underpins Braidotti’s feminist
materialism (Authors, 2017, 13–22; Cudworth and
Hobden 2015, 136–137). All may be characterised how-
ever as posthumanist and post-anthropocentric; materi-
ally embedded and embodied; relational and contingent
rather than essentialist or absolute; and as supplying
social theory with the means to re-immerse itself in
a material world that is plural, complex, heterogeneous
and emergent. New materialist ontology is monistic,
rejecting dualisms of nature/culture, human/non-
human, structure/agency, reason/emotion, animate/
inanimate and mind/matter. The increased recent inter-
est in materialist perspectives among feminists and
others has been seen as a reaction against social con-
structionism and textual approaches in social theory
(Coole and Frost 2010, 2) though critics have also linked
it to neoliberalisation (Braun 2015; Pellizzoni 2016). The
other principal criticisms of the newmaterialisms are that
they de-politicise social justice struggles by sidelining
essentialist models of identity; that the absence of any
conception of social structures, mechanisms or systems
undermines capacity to analyse power, resistance and
inequalities; and that their ‘newness’ is only in relation
to Western and Eurocentric ontology. For overviews of
the newmaterialisms and discussions of these issues, see
(Fox and Alldred, 2018; Coole and Frost 2010; Cudworth
and Hobden 2015; Devellennes and Dillet 2018; Rosiek,
Snyder, and Pratt 2019).
6 The claimed positive relationship between economic
development and environmental protection has been
queried by other scholars, who argue that indeed it is
economic development and the capitalist model of
production and accumulation that has led to the cur-
rent environmental crises (Baer 2008; Moore 2017;
Rees 2003; Wallis 2010).
7 Earlier we noted that the capacities of matter
emerge when assembling with other materialities
in events. Given that there are an inﬁnite number
of possible events, with an inﬁnite number of pos-
sible arrangements of matter, this means that we
can have no idea what potential capacities (or inca-
pacities) a body or a thing has in advance. Many
environmental protection campaigns have been
devoted to eﬀorts to address what have been con-
sidered the inherent capacities and incapacities of
particular species or inanimate non-human entities,
as revealed by scientiﬁc inquiry. For example, initia-
tives to reinstate hedges and meadow areas around
ﬁelds aim to sustain insects’ and birds’ capacities to
feed from the pollen and seeds being lost to mono-
culture agriculture; limiting ocean warming protects
the capacities of Earth’s ice-caps to sequester car-
bon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. A shift to
a relational understanding of ‘capacity’ suggests
that eﬀorts to protect such capacities should be
augmented with a broader concern to enhance
matter’s – including (post)humans’ – potential to
form as yet unknown productive assemblages with
other matter.
8 Altruistic actions range from individual behaviours
such as using electricity from renewable rather
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than cheaper sources, cutting down meat con-
sumption or limiting family size, through to
national initiatives to cease using fossil fuel
resources, recycle and reuse rather than manufac-
ture goods afresh, and support poorer nations to
adopt clean technologies: all of which have eco-
nomic costs attached.
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